to theory's otherwise energetic canon critique-as it is a byproduct of the desire for the particularly radical forms of intellectual transformation that drove theory all along. The proper name hung around-and did so despite lots of eloquent skepticism about agency, authority, and the or ga ni za tion of knowledge-because the proper name satisfi ed theory's commitment to, in Terry Ea gleton's phrase, "ideas of . . . incomparable value."
3 What High Theory off ered in the guise of a singular name, in other words, was in fact a set of thoughts that was understood not merely to add to but to fundamentally reconfi gure knowledge as we had (always "until now") known it. This is how, for instance, it was possible for a reading of "A slumber did my spirit seal" to arrive less as a contribution to our understanding of Wordsworth's oeuvre than as an essentially institutional intervention into some of our most basic practices and assumptions. Such strongly interventionist ambitions ensured that theory would operate, somewhat paradoxically, as a canon of singularities, a collection of intellectual incursions that were, by defi nition, without pre ce dent. It is certainly true that this drive toward the "incomparable" meshed (all too) con ve niently with the commodifying pro cesses of a publishing industry eager for marquee names and an academic culture only too happy to let the star system constellate its distributions of value. 4 But to treat theory's seemingly counterintuitive attachment to the proper name as merely a sign of a slightly shady alliance with the very structures it should most oppose (capitalist industries, corporate universities) overlooks the degree to which the desire for unpre ce dented intellectual transformation itself built a tendency toward canonicity into theory from the very beginning.
The current conventional wisdom, of course, is that the rigidly canonical moment of High Theory has passed. Most commentators agree that Theory's operations have now been devolved to a less monolithic set of eff orts loosely grouped by the decidedly lowercase "theory." From this perspective, the break with "oracular fi gures" that Elliott and Attridge mean to encourage is already under way. But if virtually everyone can see that theory is undergoing a salutary move away from singular names, it's all the more important to note that this devolution has not in fact diminished any of the demand for the paradigmshift ing work that helped Theory earn its capital t in the fi rst place. Indeed the two desires-for less centralized theoretical canons and for more radical intellectual transformations-are oft en seen to be mutually supporting, as if the move away from oracular fi gures was simply the fi rst, space-clearing step needed to initiate a new round of intellectual overcomings. It's with something like this understanding that Elliott and Attridge, only sentences aft er dispensing with "certain oracular fi gures," declare their ambition to chronicle a new set of "radical alterations." The aim is to replace "recent work" that has failed to be truly transformative-work, they say, whose "groundbreaking nature [is] more apparent than real"-with the sort of thing they've collected in their volume: work that "exceeds the terms of the present in a way that allows us to think something hitherto unthinkable." In their demand for the truly transformative, in their sense that one can reliably distinguish the truly groundbreaking from the illusory, and in their insistence that valuable theory deals in the "hitherto unthinkable," Elliott and Attridge resubscribe to the very model of intellectual progress that drove Theory's heyday. Their break with a canon of "oracular fi gures" in one paragraph does nothing to minimize the desire for oracular eff ects in the next. It's a peculiar turn maintained in their introduction's fi nal sentence: " 'Theory' is dead," they write, "long live theory." 5 Under this new dispensation Theory may be able to do away with the monarch, but it clearly also remains stubbornly attached to the model of monarchical succession that was the real problem in the fi rst place. Theory Aft er 'Theory' thus preserves the force of Theory, just now without the Theorist, the oracular eff ect without the "oracular fi gure. " We believe that the consequences of this compulsion toward radical transformation are not merely rhetorical. That fundamental change and paradigm shift s are now endemic to the way we have come to think about how theory shapes our understanding of intellectual work in the humanities in ways that have all kinds of practical consequences. What, we want to ask, would our intellectual landscape look like if we were less beholden to the idea of wholesale change? What if we were less committed to imagining cultural theory as an institution made up solely of breakthroughs? 6 What if we took more seriously, or embraced more fully, the break with the oracular that Elliott and Attridge propose? Is it possible, that is, not just to distance ourselves from the oracular fi gure but to orient ourselves away from oracularism as such? How might we begin to value diff erent kinds of thoughts, both current and past, if we weren't so attached to a version of intellectual progress that, in order to look like progress at all, needed to obliterate all that was hitherto thinkable? What intellectual options has this demand for radical alteration left by the wayside?
It seems to us that our intellectual projects and interests have come to have extremely short shelf lives. This puts pressure on every aspect of scholarly life. Working academics struggle to publish before the fl ag under which they began their research has been captured and replaced with another. In the period we now know as "the moment of theory" theories came to replace one another with suffi cient speed that obsolescence threatened to predate publication. 7 We hire new faculty on the basis of the topics a theory licenses, even as we can see our preferences already beginning to shift in ways that will raise questions about the new hire's research plans tomorrow. This is not an easy way to live (or work). We do not, to be sure, imagine an entirely depressurized profession or think that we should all operate as though our activities were entirely without stake. But we are concerned with how this desire for immediacy attenuates our interests. When we ask the question that lies behind an ambition like Elliott and Attridge's-What's thinkable today that wasn't thinkable yesterday?-we severely and unnecessarily restrict the shape and span of our intellectual attentions. The question presumes, for one thing, that we have somehow already "thought up" all of yesterday's thoughts, when it's not clear to us that we were ever operating with a comprehensive sense of the available options. And is it really true, as the question implies, that a thought thinkable a day or many days ago would, just by virtue of this historical quality (its "pre ce dentedness," as it were) have ceased to have any real value? From our perspective, intellectual progress need not run on a model that is so insistently unidirectional or exclusively revolutionary. It is our view that the nearly constant "crisis" in which the humanities fi nds itself has as much to do with the way its allocation of attention-its lack of interest in anything but the hitherto unthought-constantly makes it seem that the well has run nearly dry as it does with the actual value of its activities at any given moment. 8 Indeed it is this cycle of feast-then-famine-then-feast that accounts for theory's curiously double condition: simultaneously moribund and monumental, po liti cally impotent and ambitious, obsolete and an entrance requirement for a job in the academy.
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Instead of treating our academic fi elds like crowded social events, where we've scouted our next conversation before we've concluded the one we're in, we would prefer to see a looser and diff erently ambitious model of intellectual engagement, one that kept old conversations around longer or proceeded in ways more open to unscripted (and even potentially fruitless) encounters. 10 We would like to develop a less apocalyptic model of intellectual development, one more catholic and modest in approach. Of course, it's true that even this suggestion can't help but seem like another version of the demand for an intellectual sea-change. But by looking to stand aside from (rather than replace) existing models and thoughts and by thinking carefully and explicitly about the costs of attenuating our thoughts prematurely, the essays collected here feel out what a diff erent kind of critical practice might look like.
This less linear view of cultural theory does not fi t easily into the narrative arc that either traces or denies the development of theory's death rattle.
11 In any case, describing the theoretical corpus as though alive and dead were not only the relevant terms but the only available options has made it diffi cult, even for a voice as prominent as W. J. T. Mitchell's, to turn the discussion toward less rigid options. In fact his introduction to the 2004 special issue of Critical Inquiry on "the futures of criticism" makes for a particularly telling case study in this sort of strain, as it wants both to acknowledge the pervasive sense of Theory's crisis and, at the same time, to distance itself from those life-or-death options. On the one hand, Mitchell acknowledges that the symposium marks a decisive moment in Theory's fate: an unpre cedented summoning of the editorial board ("This group had never before convened in the entire thirty-year history of the journal"). Their task, Mitchell explains, was to respond to "a moment of crisis for [Critical Inquiry]'s own mission, understood as an intellectual, interdisciplinary microcosm of a global crisis, and as a global mission for peace and justice." In fairly stark contrast to this "global mission," though, Mitchell spends a good portion of his introduction laying out his vision for what he calls "medium theory," a theory oriented toward more modest claims. "Medium theory," he writes, would "stand in contrast to what has been called high theory, the aspiration to total mastery, coherence, [and] explanatory power." 12 We are all for this sort of thing. But it says a lot, we think, that Mitchell's vision has not exactly been widely endorsed.
13 Even Mitchell's own suggestion takes place in an introduction otherwise preoccupied with the vocabulary of intellectual crisis, death, and resurrection, and it arrives accompanied by his ac know ledg ment that medium theory is not likely to satisfy the assembled crowds on either side of the pro-or anti-Theory question. "Medium theory," he acknowledges, "is not going to be quite radical enough for some and probably too radical for others." 14 On the still-too-radical side, we fi nd the pointedly antitheoretical perspective of Theory's Empire (2005), edited by Daphne Pattai and Will H. Corral. Their introduction eagerly pursues the Critical Inquiry symposium as if it presented one fi nal threat (that Theory might actually be revived) and one fi nal lesson in the empty excess that, for them anyway, characterized life under Theory's imperial sway. For them, the gathering "of the found ers and promoters of Theory" and their eff ort to "reinvigorate their propositions, including, in par tic u lar, their claims to be po liti cally relevant," do nothing more than "confi rm . . . the by-now entirely established nature of assertions about Theory" and make feeble apology for "their own excesses." The goal of Theory's Empire is to sketch out a future for literary studies freed of such "tedious obligation [s] ," one in which we might move away from questions of methodology and back to questions of plea sure. We ought, they argue, to return to our basic "aff ection for literature," our "delight in the pleasures it brings," and our "respect for its ability to give memorable expression to the vast variety of human experience." 15 For these editors, no theory-even medium theory-is a good theory. 16 Accordingly even studiedly relaxed claims for theory's future, like those recently off ered by Jonathan Culler, wouldn't satisfy Pattai and Corral. In fact the modest tone of Culler's recent refl ections on theory's condition might particularly exercise Pattai and Corral, since it is precisely the extent of theory's dissemination into the basic operating procedures of many disciplines that enables Culler to rest assured that theory will remain indispensable, even if it therefore no longer counts as avant-garde. 17 Like Ea gleton, who sees some value in theory's continuing in a fairly modest form (as "a reasonably systematic refl ection on our guiding assumptions"), Culler treats theory as a set of established intellectual practices. 18 Theory, Culler admits, may now be "deprive[d]" it of its "glamor of novelty and notoriety" but that's in part because "it now seems widely accepted that any intellectual project has a basis in theory of some sort."
19 For Culler as for Ea gleton, theory "remains as indispensable as ever."
20 As the breadth of Culler's phrasing suggests ("any intellectual project"), what he imagines is a theory so fully domesticated that it no longer remains the exclusive property of the professoriate. For Culler, it's not only that graduate students "need to be aware of theoretical debates in their fi elds and able to situate themselves and their work within changing intellectual structures of the professional landscape," but that undergraduates "ought to explore" theory "as one of the most exciting and socially pertinent dimensions of the humanities."
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Insofar as this outcome would ensconce theory in the core of humanities education, it's easy to see why Culler's vision would strike the editors of Theory's Empire as a regrettable fate. It may be less easy, though, to understand why this outcome would look not only insuffi cient to some of theory's biggest proponents but, much more strongly, like a repudiation of theory's fundamental project. But for those who believe that theory's mandate is exclusively to bring about wholesale and immediate interruption, emancipation, or transcendence, any theory that fi ts happily into given academic operations, any theory that is such an institutionally useful team player, is not going to seem like theory at all. For critics like Kenneth Surin, Michael Hardt, and Clarie Colebrook, for instance, the problem with recent theoretical interventions is that they are neither exciting nor socially or po liti cally pertinent enough. Surin's introduction to the "Theory Now" special issue of South Atlantic Quarterly makes clear his sense that we occupy an exhausted present in which new oracles could not come fast enough: "The problématique, urgent for our time, of producing new emancipatory names to replace the ones that have become exhausted is, for me, a focal point of these essays." In Surin's view, theory's "exemplary vocation" is thus not only to name "this smiling or snarling beast who won't permit the aspiration for anything radically diff erent" but to slay the dragon. 22 Hardt's contribution to the same discussion is even more emphatic than Surin's, arguing that critique's proven "inability . . . to fulfi ll its transformative promises" has produced a per sis tent "melancholy" among critical theorists. This melancholy, Hardt argues, can be rectifi ed only by a move toward what he calls "militancy," a mode of thought distinguished from its more diluted sibling, "critique," by its ability to enact wholesale transformation. Where critique operates by smaller, local adjustment (in Hardt's words, critique aims "at the art of not being governed so much"), "militancy seeks . . . to govern diff erently, creating a new life and a new world." 23 Demands like Surin's and Hardt's for radical diff erence, militant thought, and unpre ce dented worlds are put in especially stark terms in Colebrook's essay "Extinction Theory," which elevates a run-of-the-mill theoretical skepticism toward the human or the humanist into a literal principle. Theory, Colebrook suggests, should embrace the example of the many extinction narratives "regarding the possible or inevitable absence of humans" to purge itself of its lingering attachment to life (as in the "vital norms" of biopolitics) or those ideas (like "re-humanizing emancipation") that might serve the interests of actually existing humans. A mode of thinking that could consider "not simply the formal absence of a population but an actual disappearance" would, Colebrook argues, restore theory to its proper function, to be "destructive of the imagination" or the "imaginary." 24 For Colebrook, the only theory aft er Theory is a theory aft er humans.
What's common to Surin, Hardt, and Colebrook, then, is the position that theory's obligation is to identify a thought that remains beyond existing politics, social forms, or the human itself. In this sense, what they are urging is not merely that we adopt positions of constant self-refl ection or self-critique but that we undertake a constant pro cess of perpetual and self-willed extinction, successively discarding one present imaginary aft er another.
What this model of successive replacement has going for it, obviously, is the thrill of its sweeping power and its refusal of half-measures. It's easy enough to see the value in renewing the demand on us, as thinkers, to advance possibilities rather than to simply rehearse the available options. And it's hard not to wince at Ea gleton's charge that those who can't "think up feminism or structuralism" are left to merely "apply such insights to MobyDick or The Cat in the Hat." 25 The reserves of intellectual energy to which views like Colebrook's (or Hardt's or Surin's) testify are considerable, and their principled refusal to be satisfi ed with the available set of options is, in and of itself, admirable. But the problem, as we see it, with construing this radicalism as theory's exclusive mission is that it puts an extraordinarily large burden on the present moment (even as it seeks to discard it). 26 For it is, aft er all, only from within the very immediate confi nes of our current "imaginary" that we might determine an idea's adequacy. Can we really trust ourselves this much? It's a real question, since the theory-as-wholesale-transformation model means that our determinations on any given issue-alive or dead, liberatory or complicit, emancipatory or not-can't help but have extremely high stakes. It is hard to imagine how, within this model, we would ever want to go back to a thought that seemed to have exhausted itself or to a prior moment that seemed to have off ered a limited purview.
Given these reservations, it seems to us like a good sign that not everyone seeking change demands that it be quite so apocalyptic or imagines that the wholly new will necessarily be quite so readily identifi able. Peter Osborne's essay "Philosophy aft er Theory," for instance, strikes us as notable for its attempt to fi nd an alternative to modes of intellectual advancement that do not simply transcend contemporary conditions. Osborne means to remind us that any "specifi c newness" necessarily stands in some sort of relation "to its negation of the old." But it's also the case that Osborne's critique ends up conserving the fi gures his own account ties to the forms of destructive negation he wants to resist in the fi rst place (Nietz sche, Heidegger, Benjamin, and Deleuze). Osborne's fi nal proposition is for "a renewed investigation of the underlying affi nities between Hegel's and Nietz sche's thought" and a return to the "exemplary" work of Benjamin and of Deleuze and Guattari. 27 His essay thus seems to turn in a rather small circle in order to salvage the very oracular fi gures we were meant to give up. Like Osborne, Cary Wolfe's essay "Theory as a Research Program-The Very Idea" seems to move in two directions at once: both cautioning against and subscribing to the simplifi ed appeal of the categorically new. In favor of the radical break, Wolfe argues that theory should not abandon its allegiance to "unconditional freedom" (its re sistance to, "say, technical training and the development of applied knowledge") even as his engagement with the pragmatism of Barbara Herrnstein Smith and Richard Rorty acknowledges that "unconditionality is never entirely possible." 28 Theory's role, as Wolfe portrays it, is to function as an antidote to the conditioning power of disciplinary norms, carving out a space for the "unconditional freedom [that] is the raison d'être of the university" (even as that raison must lie on the other side of any actual être). "Professing theory," for Wolfe, thus comes to mean operating counter to the otherwise professionalizing missions of what he repeatedly calls "the corporate university." 29 But that it is Derrida who turns out to be the fi gure who best represents the promise of the "unconditioned" or the antidisciplinary only serves to underscore the degree to which theory has developed not only a curriculum but also a set of protocols as thoroughly codifi ed as those involved in "technical training and the development of applied knowledge." Thus even as both of these accounts seem aimed at complicating the charismatic avant-garde-ism to which high theory seemed prone, there is also a strange conservatism in the per sis tence of both the oracular fi gure and the as-yet uncharted land (a renewed new, a diff erent elsewhere) to which that oracle points.
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What we are aft er is an alternative to both the apocalyptic model of radical replacement (where we start brand new) and the recursive return to a Derrida or a Hegel (where we simply start over). What's required, we think, is a version of theory that is able to refl ect more openly and more substantially on the distribution of intellectual attention at any given moment. Both the apocalyptic and recursive models of theoretical activity eff ectively linearize the intellectual landscape, such that one can either (which is to say only) leap radically forward or restart from the old beginnings. Our wager here is that the resources that are available for thinking are less cut-and-dried than either of these models suggest; we're guessing that it can't be the case that absolutely new (which is what Surin wants) or tried and true (which is how Osborne and Wolfe shape the question) are really the only kinds of names (or thoughts) there are. Because our approach eschews both these forms of the oracular, it's obviously hard for us to "call for" something without seeming hypocritical. But what we're imagining here, and what we think the contributions we've collected exemplify, is a diff erent (more modest and more fl exible) attitude toward those things that we have, for what ever reason, set aside or to which we have remained indiff erent. We want to be clear, though, that we don't see the drastically unequal distribution of attention as a moral failing. That things look the way they do is, in many cases, simply another sign that attention is necessarily scarce: people are busy; publication is fi nicky; translation is worse; and just framing a debate one way can-innocentlyobscure other intellectual trajectories. Our argument, then, is not that we have been paying attention to the wrong fi gures. We have had good reason to be interested in the names and debates we all know. But we think that the set of options available to us at any one time are much more extensive than we have been able to appreciate or acknowledge. Grant Farred is right, in this sense, to suggest that we need to "train ourselves . . . to 'linger' over our thoughts, to extend them, to take our time with them."
31 But the question of patience extends not only to those thinkers or thoughts we already know but to those we do not. We're all for a patient reading of Derrida (in case anyone's fl own through it). But we also suggest that our patience must become something more systematic, something like a genial skepticism toward the structures of our own attentions. The alternative to the contemporary condition is not, we think, an oracular void waiting to be fi lled but in fact already comprises the myriad interesting and immediately available details that are thinkers who did not gain instantaneous traction; thoughts that seemed to be without po liti cal promise; ideas that, for what ever reason, didn't fi t the shape of an already recognized need. This collection does not seek the "unconditioned," in other words, but instead looks to focus more closely on the local possibilities that our desire for sweeping gestures and virgin territories cannot stoop to notice.
We think slowing ourselves down in this way is particularly important when it comes to theoretical concerns. A theoretical canon, we would suggest, is not subject to the same degree of external pressure as, for example, a literary canon. Whereas literature departments (like most humanities departments) respond in part to forms of human activity that take place outside of the academy, a department of theory (if there were such a thing) would respond largely to the forms of thought that it itself had generated. The pressure on a theoretical canon thus is primarily restricted to those who are already participating in it. This is not to say that there hasn't been social pressure on theory. The humanities, for example, have come under attack for teaching feminism, Marxism, deconstruction, Foucault, and so on. But it is telling that the pressure has tended to come in the form of a question about whether we should be "doing theory" at all-as if it were a closed and undifferentiated fi eld-rather than about which theories we should be doing or about the pro cesses that have led us to treat only certain thoughts as capable of standing in for theory in the fi rst place. (Ea gleton's dichotomy, between those who do theory and those who merely apply or practice theory, makes clear just how actively theory has operated as a restricted fi eld within the already narrowed world of the academy.) The debates we have had-about Foucauldianism versus Marxism, say, or feminism versus psychoanalysisare debates that existed for the most part only among theorists themselves and thus took place only among people whose work already fi t one of a relatively few available models. Even our fi ghts never really risked a radical numerousness of options. When Frank Kermode (to give a short example) recognized that the theory of canonicity and aesthetic evaluation he had been assembling did not fi t any of the available positions in what had blossomed as the "canon wars," he was discovering that even debates (and even debates about canons) produce their own form of tunnel vision. 32 The fact that so many recent articles on theory's future cite Derrida is indicative of how tightly framed theory's own forms of self-refl ection remain.
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Part of the work undertaken by the essays collected here is to illustrate some of the consequences of such institutional conditions. One essay charts how queer theory came to be hived off from one half of its intellectual roots in sociology. Another looks at the way a theory of voluntary action developed, at least initially, through an investigation of pigeons might impact our accounts of identity and reading alike. What essays like these off er is not another iteration of the oft -repeated call for "more" interdisciplinarity. Rather their goal is to acknowledge that correcting our natural insularity is, inevitably, a never-ending project and to provide a historically detailed sense of the options for rethinking any par tic u lar, local confi guration. Doing this involves not only a form of self-scrutiny that calls our practices to account but an active will to go looking for trouble we didn't know we needed.
It's because we start from this par tic u lar set of concerns that we fi nd two recent statements on theory particularly useful. The fi rst, William Rasch's contribution to Theory Aft er 'Theory,' argues that theory's job description is not limited to analyzing things that are out there in the world (a state apparatus, a discipline, an institution) but also includes thinking about itself as a system operating in the midst of other systems. In one sense, this refl exive, relentlessly contextualizing view lines up with the descriptions of theory off ered by Wolfe, Osborne, and Farred, each of whom acknowledges what Wolfe calls theory's constant "conjuncture with forces that are disciplinary, institutional and even . . . 'ideological.' " 34 But where Wolfe's description of theory's "conjuncture with forces" sees theory as a heroic eff ort to produce unconditioned thought in the midst of contextualizing conditions, Rasch wants us to step outside "the mode of perpetual crisis, the demand [for] more critique, more education, more enlightenment." 35 His concern is that critical theory's proximity to "the battlefi eld" and "the barricades" may obscure the many ways in which our "various values do not cohere" or the way "norms once harmoniously united now 'tragically' confl ict." 36 Such small-scale tensions, confl icts, and incoherencies tend to disappear under the myth-size struggles that dominate theory's storylines (between the now and the future, the thinkable and the unthinkable, the already institutionalized and the not yet available). Rasch's essay helps us see that a properly systemic perspective is not opposed to but in fact requires small-scale observation.
Rasch's call for an immanent description even of theory itself aligns closely with the notion of "working through" to which Rei Terada turns in her essay "The Frailty of the Ontic," the other recent statement about theoretical practice with which we want to note a par tic u lar affi nity. The psychoanalytic notion of working through off ers Terada a view of "the complexity of experience," in which a life appears as "a density that cannot be completely untangled." As opposed to standard "moral philosophy," whose "artifi cially normative conventions" presort certain phenomena (killing, crying, loving, etc.) as signifi cant while determining other phenomena (the squeak of a bicycle, the sound of water on the roof, a passing smell) "insignifi cant for action," working through puts no necessary limits on what will get counted as important and what will be relegated to "mere" background. Working through deals with "the interaction of multiple registrations of diff erent perceptions, which meet diff erent degrees of re sis tance, and also with registrations of various kinds and levels: an internally diff erentiated, open-ended, always changing, maximally complex network of registrations, each of which potentially changes everything, albeit just a little bit and never necessarily for the good." Like Rasch, who wants a more micrological account of the tensions (or re sis tances) in our normative frameworks, Terada suggests our psychological and ontological landscapes ought to be credited with a similar complexity. Both views are designed to resist the tendency (a moral philosophical one, in Terada's terms) to simplify the world according to a "typecast" hierarchy of values. 37 It's been our intention from our fi rst conversations about this project (don't ask how long ago) to put something like the view Rasch and Terada propose into practice as a diff erent way of thinking about both the history and the condition of theory. We were frustrated by the options we saw for thinking about theory's condition only in terms of its life or its death, and we saw in those options a continuation of the zero-sum notion of intellectual progress in which theory had specialized all along (i.e., unpre ce dented thoughts, emancipatory names). 38 In trying to posit an alternative to the question "What's next for theory?," we asked our contributors to consider alternative intellectual trajectories that may have lain dormant behind the large-scale replacements (structuralism by poststructuralism, feminism by queer theory, agency by ontology) that characterized theory's progress.
Our basic thought was that at any moment of developmental crisis, the course of theory could have broken another way. What, we wanted to know, would some of those options have looked like?
Thinking about that way of framing the project now, one feeling we have is that it probably seems still more susceptible to notions of progress and replacement than we're entirely comfortable with. In defense of our earlier selves, though, we would note that it is just the case that it's very hard to talk about pro cesses and transactions in ways that don't end up feeling like narrative progressions (in which an orphaned theory is returned to its inheritance, say) and that we're okay with that. The eff ort, this is to say, was not to reject sequence or progress or even "the new"; it was to dilute the hold they had on our intellectual attentions by asking people to move laterally and retroactively, to think specifi cally about what might already be out there. Because the project is committed to drawing alternative maps, we simply tried to characterize the kind of attitude or perspective we had in mind instead of asking authors to focus on any specifi c theoretical concern or subfi eld. And in keeping with that initial impulse, we would stress that the results presented here are necessarily exemplary. These are neither rescue missions (claims for what theory should have been) nor white papers (policy proposals for theory's future). They are, rather, examples of what theoretical work might look like if it bore more programmatic attention to what its own developmental logics leave aside. 40 The body of the book is divided into three parts: "Chronologies Aside," "Approaches Aside," and "Figures Aside." Each of these is or ga nized around a diff erent valence of the question of aside-ness or adjacency. Part I houses a set of accounts that explicitly examine questions of chronological sequence, currency, nextness, or nowness. As even the titles of Theory Now or Theory Aft er 'Theory' make abundantly clear, currency and sequence remain built in to the way we frame the very question of theory's condition (not to mention that question's answer). But how long is a moment? How singular is the now? When has the past fallen behind us? Is the future really in front of us?
The volume opens with Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's previously unpublished essay on the history of homophobia. This piece (originally a paper presented, we think, as a short talk at Amherst) discusses the diffi culties of writing alternative histories. Because, as Sedgwick points out, one is necessarily always operating with an already established archive of terms and relations and assumptions, it is not clear that one can simply up and decide to tell a diff erent story or go looking for a hidden ideological history as if discursive operations had all the objective solidity of buried trea sure. As best we can tell, the paper's delivery preceded the publication of Epistemology of the Closet (1990) , though the problems of archive, exclusion, and occlusion that work engages are clearly visible here in early form. The situation Sedgwick describes-in which one realizes that the knowledge required even to pose a historical question exists only in a diff erently confi gured knowledge bankserves as a hallmark of both the challenges of the counterhistorical project we've attempted to undertake here as well as a lesson in the kinds of oblique movements necessary if it is to be undertaken at all.
Where Sedgwick is interested in the diffi culty of moving between one archive and another-or even of knowing about the existence of one archive from inside another-Anne-Lise François examines the possibility of moving laterally across or more loosely among cultural objects. Drawing our attention to what she calls the "minimal affi rmations" in the late work of Sedgwick, Roland Barthes, and William Empson, François off ers a clear-eyed study in both the promises and a certain treacherousness of these open, minimally demanding, and antisuspicious aesthetics. While she fi nds much to admire in these thoughts, she also off ers important considerations about "the place of this accepting, easy mode in a culture (both in the university and beyond) committed to de-skilling labor" and ensuring "the ever-readiness of cultural goods." Natalie Melas takes up the question of the present as it has been treated (recently and not so recently) in postcolonial theory. While it may be diffi cult to think of a theoretical fi eld that has devoted more attention to discontinuous, disrupted, and uneven chronologies, Melas argues that many current construals of postcolonial theory continue to rely on "particularly absolute teleological repre sen ta tion[s] of that past." In a remarkable discussion of Ernst Bloch and C. L. R. James, Melas suggests that these stubborn teleologies might be undone by remembering that "epochs are not closed in on themselves with absolute limits" and that "the historical time of modernity" therefore has a "multidirectional aspect" thanks to a "complex interplay between contemporaneity and noncontemporaneity."
Where Melas carefully draws our attention to the complexity of thinking in and of time, Elizabeth Povinelli demonstrates how critical theory's overriding concern with the production and management of life in contemporary liberal society has blockaded attention to the extinguishment of life that is, she argues, a necessary byproduct of forwarding any project. Povinelli asks, "What might the future of critical theory have been if it had distinguished its approach to power from the problem of the repressive forces but nevertheless allowed itself to acknowledge its own acts of altercide and sui-cide?" Drawing on Spinoza's conception of the conatus, Povinelli demonstrates that an ethics that attends both to the production and the extinguishment of life requires "the radical leveling of modes of being." If we are to redress the absence of any discussion of extinguishment in theories of multiplicity, she maintains, then we are going to have to avoid repeating the "generational debate between the repressive and productive hypotheses" and instead develop ethical and po liti cal theories that are "on the side of potentiality and yet ha[ve] a relation to the limits of plasticity."
One can immediately see the force of Povinelli's claim-that every advancement entails extinguishment-by considering the number of methodologies that fell to the wayside in a theoretical moment otherwise devoted to detailing the consequences of our methodological suppositions. Theoretical oracularism, in other words, did not simply restrict our attentions to a limited number of thinkers; it also prompted us to prioritize overwhelmingly those methodologies that could present themselves as directly overturning a previous model's common sense. Again the problem with this way of proceeding, as we see it, is that it eff ectively binarizes the question of method, reducing it to a face-off between those doing the overturning and those maintaining the status quo. The result is the false sense that methods are available in only two forms: the visionary and the blinkered. As a way of un-typecasting this drama, as Terada might put it, part II discusses a set of theoretical frameworks, and views on theoretical frameworks, in which overcoming is not necessarily synonymous with the conception of method.
Simon Jarvis, for instance, describes a "historical poetics" that he fi nds modeled theoretically in the work of Alexander Veselovsky and Theodor Adorno and practically (i.e., poetically) in the verse of Alexander Pope. For Jarvis, historical poetics ought to greatly expand our sense of what counts as poetic technique and "prosodic intelligence" by allowing us to see any stretch of verse as the product of multiple sets of constraints: "the constraint of making sense in En glish and the constraints selected by the poet's metrical art" and the vast history of verse practice that helps defi ne the value of any poetic decision. By focusing on how even poetic virtuosity involves, and indeed requires a relationship to an established and evolving fi eld of pre ce dents, Jarvis suggests a model in which neither the development of poetry nor the practice of reading poetry would follow the hard angles of aesthetic or theoretical rupture.
Pheng Cheah criticizes the way our accounts of power have so oft en restricted themselves to seeing it as either "conferring or withholding . . . recognition in social relations." For Cheah, the recognition model off ered by people like Judith Butler and others mistakenly slants our understanding of Foucault's notion of biopower in two directions: fi rst, it orients us primarily toward questions of "the intersubjective constitution of consciousness" and, second, it causes power to seem to operate according to exclusively "prohibitive and repressive" models. Drawing on the considerable resources made available by the United Nations work on the material pro cesses of globalization, Cheah argues that "the female subjects of globalization" can help us "come to terms with power's physical dimension." Doing so, Cheah argues, is essential since "we cannot adequately explain the tenaciousness of global capitalism or hope to resist it if we cling to the dogma that oppression primarily operates through forms of consciousness."
This focus on physical embodiment, on a resolutely material view of the human subject, also features in Irene Tucker's revisionary account of the history of racialized skin. Tucker returns to Kant's writing on race to argue to argue that racialized skin might serve an important philosophical, epistemological, and, above all, universalizing function. The hold the deconstructive or semiotic account of race has had on our thinking-under the grip of which we constantly remind ourselves that skin color is an empty signifi erhas, Tucker argues, obscured an older vision in which a "race without racism" served to "announce a universal aspiration to a likeness that would allow us to escape the privation of our fi nitude as individual subjects." Like Tucker's intervention in the history of our thinking about race, Jordan Stein also asks us to return us to an earlier moment to look at the way a single eff ort crystallized into two apparently opposed discourses. For Stein, the long-standing opposition in the study of African American culture between interpretive and bibliographic modes of study has truncated the possibility of our "learning from scholars working in cognate modes." Drawing our attention back to some of the early architects of African American studies whose work exhibited a "methodological pluralism," Stein argues that we would do well not to look for the "next big thing" but, more modestly, to encourage "disciplinary wholeness."
The kind of rapprochement Stein is proposing between the interpretive and the bibliographic arms of African American literary studies fi nds a parallel in Karen Beckman's suggestion that "the introduction of animation as a primary topic of concern for the discourse of fi lm theory will not simply add new material . . . [but will] help to catalyze full-scale conceptual reorganizations." Long a neglected question in media studies (which preferred to specialize in "fi lm"), animation not only off ers a "a useful lens" for considering older work but, Beckman argues, is an increasingly important category in the contemporary digital context, whose "use of compositing and the frequent absence of continuous shooting threaten to jeopardize some of the central traits we associate with a cinema that defi nes itself in opposition to animation." Part III takes up the case of specifi c fi gures who in various ways lay athwart (or beneath) the mainline of theory's development. William Flesch's discussion of George Ainslie's theory of hyperbolic discounting and intertemporal bargaining off ers a relatively unknown but enormously useful vision of mental life, desire, and subjectivity. A variety of factors may have contributed to keeping Ainslie out of the light of theoretical attention, among them, the authority that psychoanalytic criticism already enjoyed on such questions and a prejudice in the humanities against what are perceived to be the "usually reductive and cheerless explanatory systems based on economics and experimental theory." But Ainslie's work is, Flesch contends, "as challenging, important, exciting, provocative, powerful, and far-reaching as anything you'll fi nd in literary theory over the past two de cades," and his account shows how Ainslie's theories of risk and reward, desire, and psychological bargaining might off er insight into both our literary and our intersubjective experiences.
If Flesch's essay shows how the devotion of our collective attentions to one current line of theoretical thought obscures our ability to recognize other valuable modes of inquiry (even those operating on the same general theoretical terrain), then Mark Hansen's essay provides an important case study for why we should be careful not to archive the thoughts of thinkers who seemed untimely in their own day. Hansen exploits the "unrealized potential" of Whitehead's metaphysics for current discussions of sensation and twenty-fi rst-century media studies. Hansen radicalizes Whitehead's model of perception by reading it in the context of psychophysics, a move that allows him (in combination with a reading of Merleau-Ponty) to chart an alternative to post-Kantian philosophy that avoids integrating "sensation into higherorder forms of experience and/or linguistic or conceptual analysis." This theoretical rearrangement makes it possible for Hansen to address the twenty-fi rst century as a time in which sensation is not exclusively phenomenological (taking place in human bodies). Rather he argues that the advent of digital devices and other new media technologies "comprises both an intensifi cation of our properly human sensibility and an expansion of the domain of worldly sensibility" such that we can now capture and begin to understand the "extraperceptual" dimension of experience.
Hansen's interest in a notion of "generalized sensibility" informs the socio log i cal focus of the fi nal two essays in the collection. Heather Love argues that the shape of sexuality studies today refl ects a "divide between the humanities and the social sciences," but that this divide "has not always been as strong as it now is." For Love, the work of Gayle Rubin and particularly Erving Goff man shows us how intertwined the humanities and social science genealogies of queer studies already are. In Goff man's work on stigma, Love fi nds a method that is "attentive to questions of mediating without losing track of the world, self-refl exive without turning in on itself entirely." She follows the legacy of Goff man's "descriptive, observational method" through the work of Philip Toynbee and Laud Humphreys and out into contemporary queer studies. Her claim is that these approaches, which combine the analytic procedures of close reading with the observational practices of postwar microsociology, not only off er queer studies methodological lessons for handling the "partial identifi cations" that take place through "quasi-universal and fl exible categories" but also open up the possibility of forging "crucial alliances" between disciplines that have for too long seen themselves opposed.
Frances Ferguson's essay takes up questions of communication and agreement as they are made conspicuous (or conspicuously absent) in the so cio log i cal experiment in verbal behavior that was I. A. Richards's Practical Criticism (the compiled results of Richards's having asked students to respond to poems with no preparation or even the help of knowing the author's name). For Ferguson, the value of Richards's approach is that it steers us away from the sense that "reading literature [involves] signing a contractual agreement about what one would and would not notice." Unlike the bulk of the past half century of criticism, which has, Ferguson argues, or ga nized itself around attaining agreement, the responses Richards collects from his students show just how unstable and variable our readings are, how oft en they diff er from the readings of others, and how much variance there can be between even a single person's reading at diff erent times. Richards's insight, as Ferguson describes it, was not only that psychology could not be separated from reading, but that, for just this reason, criticism had built into itself a tool for "tracking the fl uctuating values of human behavior, including linguistic and literary behavior." In Ferguson's view, criticism thus comes to count as a "strongly ethical" activity insofar as its ability to keep tabs on the fl uctuations in our responses to language and literature gives us the possibility of responding seriously to our own (and others') responses.
Taken as a whole, these essays demonstrate an orientation toward theoretical inquiry that is capable of opening up problems and conversations without having to insist that intellectual progress must always come at the cost of jet-tisoning our older ways of seeing. There is no doubt that the essays collected here are deeply ambitious: they address large, complicated categories (e.g., sensation, race, power, contemporaneity) and they take up thorny institutional and methodological questions (about poetics, close reading, bibliography, and the relations between academic disciplines). At the same time, though, each of these essays asks us to consider (and oft en to consider softening) the rigidity with which we have tended to frame intellectual work as a ceaselessly oppositional struggle. What stands out to us upon reading through these essays once more is their remarkable absence of insistence, their ability to off er alternatives without having to discover error at every turn.
We would be willing to see these collected essays as an attempt to make good on the desire Elliott and Attridge express for a theory that could do away with oracular fi gures. The truth, though, is that the oracular remains an occupational hazard even when one works hard to minimize its lures. It's certainly true, for instance, that many of these essays off er up a new lens for an old issue or focus on a thinker whose perspective seems valuable precisely because it allows us to move through some conceptual static in a way that can't help but feel like linear progress. As one essay puts it, "The only way through such diffi culties is forward." Or, as we would put it, any way through some diffi culty is bound to feel like forward.
But in feeling our way forward, we need not follow the editors of The Structuralist Controversy, who, when faced with "the exigencies of [their] present intellectual conjuncture," went directly aft er the "old sureties." We think the old sureties aren't that sure-and some aren't even that old. The shape of our attentions is neither consistent nor given, and it's only by radically limiting its range that we've been able to divine the before from the aft er, the obsolete from the current, or the tired surety from the trying exigency. 41 What the Structuralist Controversy editors did not foresee was the way their construal of the present as a "conjuncture"-as an ongoing collision between the old and the immediate, the before and the aft er-would itself generate the "systematic reference point[s]" around which "successive conceptual webs" get or ga nized. One can see why one might want, as they did, to replace a Hegel who could center "conceptual webs" with "a conceptual system which aspires to be without center, without origin, or without end." But it would have been hard to see, only three years aft er the original conference, that the very fi gures (Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze) who had transubstantiated Hegel from a center to a specter (who "still haunts us") would themselves shortly recenter our attentions. 42 Even harder to foresee would have been the speed with which many of the participants in one of Theory's original "controvers[ies]" would themselves disappear from critical attention in relatively short order. "No symposium," said Richard Macksey, quoting Jean Hippolite's concluding remarks, "without its shadow." But shadows, in fact, stretch out far past those cast by the immediate light of the symposium. As the participant list makes clear, even many of those who contributed to the symposium are no longer familiar names. Looking back, we fi nd that The Structuralist Controversy has as much to say about how our critical attentions inevitably become or ga nized around certain fi gures-and just as inevitably transmute others into shadows-as it does about the status of the subject.
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In this sense, what Theory Aside proposes is not just a return to one of the animating principles of the structuralist controversy-that there are no structures without shadows-but a model for how we might keep this fact as a more constant presence in our intellectual work. The goal here is not to resurrect the theoretical past entire or to remake the theoretical present around the next big idea. The eff ort is rather to lay out a version of intellectual development that, by being willing to proceed less dramatically, less linearly, and less oligarchically, might also be able to refl ect on its own inevitable blind spots more thoroughly and more patiently. Such a practice may, at bottom, require making more modest claims. And if it didn't seem so strangely self-canceling, we'd say that modest claims are exactly what this moment in critical history requires. Actually, we'll say it anyway. Notes 1. Elliott and Attridge, "Introduction," 3. 2. Surin, "Introduction," 5 3. Ea gleton, Aft er Theory, 1. 4. For a discussion of the relations between theory's intellectual avant-garde-ism and the publishing industry's commodifi cation, see Osborne, "Philosophy aft er Theory." For an account of the star system, see David Shumway, "The Star System in Literary Studies," pmla 112 (January 1997): 85-100.
5. Elliott and Attridge, "Introduction," 4, 14. 6. Cultural theory, of course, is not the only institution that has sought to conceive itself almost entirely as a set of paradigm shift s. The desire to rethink from the ground up-to be a disruptive technology-is ubiquitous, visible in everything from ted Talks to think tanks like the Breakthrough Institute, which is set up to be something like an incubator for unpre ce dentedness. The Breakthrough Institute's mission was born out of a familiar sense of formal exhaustion-"We believe that today's po liti cal dysfunction refl ects the exhaustion of older paradigms"-and off ers an entirely formal rejuvenation: "paradigm-shift ing research and writing" that is "by its nature unpop u lar among the powerful defenders of the status quo." We would like to take our distance from this incessantly renovating Zeitgeist. We are, to be clear, not opposed to new ideas (or even transformations!), but we would also say that there is something particularly (and paradoxically) reductive in imagining that the world is neatly divided into "powerful defenders of status quos" and disruptive "paradigm shift ers" or that one can immediately identify those thoughts that would (or would not) shift paradigms on inception. The institute's website is www.thebreakthrough.org (accessed 9 November 2012).
7. If the threat of obsolescence seems an unavoidable consequence of an insistence on academic progress (all ideas have shelf lives), in other words, it is important to see that Theory not only accelerated these normal operating conditions but, in its more or less serial replacements of one school by the next, acted as the agent of its own foreshortening. From this perspective, the steep curve of Theory's rise and the sharp curve of its dramatic obsolescence give Theory's narrative a storybook symmetry that is not at all accidental. It is rather an important refl ection of the way a sense of an ending has been intrinsic to Theory's operations from its very beginning. In this light we might associate the theoretical moment less with a set of thinkers who share a method, however abstract, and more with the substitutive pro cess by which one critical method replaces another.
8 9. For a suggestion of Theory's increasing po liti cal quiescence, see one of the or ganiz ing propositions to which participants in Critical Inquiry's symposium "The Future of Literary Criticism" were asked to respond: "It has been suggested that theory now has backed off from its earlier sociopo liti cal engagements and its sense of revolutionary possibility and has undergone a 'therapeutic turn' to concerns with ethics, aesthetics, and care of the self, a turn of which Lacan is the major theoretical symptom. True?" See Mitchell, "Medium Theory," 330. For the connection between Theory and employability, see Michael F. Berubé, Theory, Jobs, and the Future of Literary Studies (New York: New York University Press, 1997).
10. Maybe we will have to fi nd new modes of proceeding anyway. The recent, and quite literally geographic, scaling-up of theoretical inquiry-from the national to the transnational to the planetary-does not seem as if it can continue forever. Barring something like interstellar theory, it seems inevitable that theoretical discourse will have to allow itself to undergo something like an inward turn. In this sense we will all be doing sustainability theory. For a recent set of considerations very congenial to our suggestions here, see Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure, in par tic u lar her introduction "Low Theory" (1-25). Actually, we had hoped to include an essay by Halberstam, but, because of scheduling, it didn't work out. We remain supportive of her suggestion in the introduction to The Queer Art of Failure that theory might be reimagined as "an ambulatory journey though the unplanned, the unexpected, the improvised, and the surprising" any form of interdisciplinarity that imagines it can simply transcend the category of disciplines. "It would be diffi cult," Farred writes, "to say that we have 'withdrawn' from the discipline. . . . We must, instead . . . acknowledge that it is the discipline . . . that compels us to think" (" 'Science Does Not Think,' " 73).
29. Wolfe, "Theory as a Research Program," 46, 47. 30. On this point we might note that Pheng Cheah originally planned to write an essay for this volume on whether there was a linguistic turn. Cheah's thought was that the representation-discursive turn of late twentieth-century theory was not a given (and indeed that it fi t awkwardly alongside its more general critique of the human). Among the ideas that might emerge if we were to care less about language, Cheah suggested, was a nondiscursive account of force (as opposed to power). We think it sounds like a great essay and are still looking forward to reading it.
31. Farred, " 'Science Does Not Think,' " 73. 32. Frank Kermode's history of his own attempts to insert his thoughts on literary value into what had taken shape as the canon wars can be found at the beginning of An Appetite for Poetry (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). His description reads, in part:
For quite a long time I had been thinking about the literary canon, its intellectual and institutional status, fi nding the whole issue to be far more complicated than anybody seemed to have supposed. I presented a brief paper on the subject to the Modern Language Association meeting of 1974, and developed the theme in a lecture of 1978; both are included in The Art of Telling. But before that book appeared the topic of canon had quite spontaneously risen to somewhere near the top of the theoretical agenda. A whole issue of Critical Inquiry, later published in augmented form as a book, was dedicated to the problem. W. J. T. Mitchell, the editor of the journal, told me he had not planned such an issue, that the contributions had simply arrived on his desk, as if the existence of the topic, and its contentiousness, had mysteriously and simultaneously declared itself everywhere and to everybody. In fact there is no real mystery, for the transfer of attention from works of literature to modes of signifi cation, a transfer required by most modern critical theory, was bound to raise the question of literary value. (2)
